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JOHN S. BOYD CO. V BOSTON GAS CO.: AN ARGUMENT FOR
THE CREATION OF A UNIFORM FEDERAL RULE
REQUIRING EXPRESS RELEASES OF
CERCLA LIABILITY IN
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the scant legislative history surrounding the enactment
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),' it is clear that Congress intended
that parties who create environmental problems should shoulder
the financial responsibility of cleanups.2 However, apportioning
CERC[A liability is becoming increasingly difficult in the corporate
arena, especially in the event of a liquidation or when one company
purchases the assets of another.3 Although CERCLA defines "re-
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 § 101-404, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). CERCLA is noto-
rious for its indefinite legislative history. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986). Some courts have suggested that
the lack of history indicates that Congress intended courts to develop a federal
common law to supplement CERCLA. See e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp.
1298, 1308 n.8 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (suggesting that inconsistent results under CER-
CLA demonstrate need for federal common law); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-09 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding that legislative history of
CERCLA supports development of uniform federal rules).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6120 [hereinafter H. REP. No. 1016]; Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d
at 1080. Congress drafted CERCLA to provide a strict liability cause of action to
facilitate government cost recovery and to induce responsible parties to voluntarily
undertake cleanups. H. REP. No. 1016, supra, at 17. For a full discussion of con-
gressional intent in enacting CERCLA, see infra notes 106-07 and accompanying
text.
3. Generally speaking, a company which purchases another company's assets
is not liable for the seller's liabilities. Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d
690, 692 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Araserv, Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and
Breeding Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (D. Mass. 1977)). However, there are
four recognized exceptions to this rule:
1) [W]hen the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agreed to
assume the selling corporation's liability;
2) when the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the
corporations;
3) when the purchaser corporation is merely a continuation of the seller
corporation; or
4) when the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape liability for
such obligations.
Id. (citing Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977)); 15
FIrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR'ORATIONS § 7122, at 232 (rev.
(507)
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sponsible parties,"4 those liable for cleanup, the statute is "silent
regarding liability of successor corporations."5 As a result, corpora-
tions have attempted to resolve liability issues contractually6 by in-
demnification or release agreements. 7
perm. ed. 1983); see also Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988) (maintaining that unless there is merger or consolida-
tion, one company that purchases another does not absorb that company's liabili-
ties and debts); FLET Er, supra § 7121, at 226 (when there is a merger and only
one corporation continues to exist, that corporation is liable for debts, contracts,
and torts of defunct corporation).
4. "Responsible parties" are liable for: cleanup costs incurred by the govern-
ment, damages, the costs of any studies implemented, and response costs incurred
by any other parties. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). CERCLA defines
.responsible parties" as:
(1) [T]he owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity... and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities... from which there is a re-
lease, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs ....
Id. For a further discussion of liability of potentially responsible parties ("PRPs"),
see infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
5. American Nat'l Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp., No. 89 C 0168, 1990 WL
125368, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 1990); Andrew S. Hogeland & Mary Griffin, Envi-
ronmental Liabilities of Successor and Parent Corporations Under CERCLA, 35 BOSTON
BAR ASS'N 6 (Apr. 1991); Dennis G. Walsh, Corporate Successor Liability Under CER-
CLA, 79 ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N 454 (Sept. 1991). See also L. De-Wayne Layfield,
Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal Common Law: Responding to an Un-
certain Legal Standard, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1237, 1238 (1990) (noting that CERCLA and
legislative history do not discuss successor liability).
6. CERCLA does not prohibit transferring liability by contract. See CERCLA
§ 107(e) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1) ("Nothing in this subsection shall bar any
agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for
any liability under this section"). Any person or entity, potentially liable under
CERCLA may enter into a contractual release of liability. Southland Corp. v. Ash-
land Oil, 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988); FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co.,
668 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn. 1987). Such contractual arrangements have
been described as "tangential" to the enforcement of CERCLA. Mardan Corp. V.
C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Thaddeus
Bereday, Note, Contractual Transfers of Liability under CERCLA Section 107(e)(1): For
Enforcement of Private Risk Allocations in Real Property Transactions, 43 CAsE W. REs. L.
REV. 161, 203-04 (1992) (arguing that second part of CERCLA § 107(e) impliedly
authorizes risk allocation agreements between parties). See generally Brian 0. Do-
lan, Misconceptions of Contractual Indemnification Against CERCLA Liability: Judicial
Abrogation of the Freedom to Contract, 42'CAH. U. L. Rav. 179 (1992) (discussing
judicial inclination to hold that PRP may indemnify another PRP for CERCLA
costs).
7. Bereday, supra note 6 at 164 n.6. While both indemnifications and releases
purport to transfer liability, there are differences in form between the two. With
[Vol. V. p. 507
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Judicial inconsistency, however, continues to impede these
agreements. Most courts, reluctant to fashion a uniform federal
rule, have continued to apply state common law to interpret these
contracts." While some courts espouse the view that any broad and
general release of future liabilities effects a transfer of CERCLA
costs,9 other courts have demanded language specifically referring
to "CERCLA-like" liabilities to transfer liability.10
This Note explores the issue of contractually transferring CER-
CLA liability in the context of the recent decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in John S. Boyd Co., Inc.
v. Boston Gas Co." In interpreting the contract at issue, the court
applied Massachusetts law. 12 The court determined that the agree-
ment did not transfer CERCLA liability because the language did
not provide for a general release, nor for transfer of future liabil-
ity.'3 This Note suggests that a case-by-case approach under state
law offers little predictability as to which parties must pay CERCLA
cleanup costs.
Part II of this Note gives an overview of the cases supporting
the broad language theory of contract interpretation as well as
those advocating an express language requirement to transfer CER-
CLA liability. Part III explains the factual scenario of Boston Gas,
an indemnity, one party assumes the burden of paying future costs that may accrue
to the other party. See id. A release is a surrender of a cause of action by a party
that may have a viable claim. Id. at 165 n.9. Put simply, indemnification is affirma-
tive risk-shifting whereas release is defensive risk-shielding. Id. at 194.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1993)
(applying Oklahoma law to interpret indemnity clause); Olin Corp. v. Consoli-
dated Aluminum Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1133, 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (incorporating
New York law as "matter of statutory interpretation and judicial policy" when con-
struing agreements allocating CERCLA costs); Robertshaw Controls Co. v. Watts
Regulator Co., 807 F. Supp. 144, 153 (D. Me. 1992) (Massachusetts law used to
ascertain scope of CERCLA releases, unless that law contravenes federal goals);
Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (em-
ploying state contract law to interpret release agreement); Mardan, 804 F.2d at
1460 (holding that New York law should provide content of federal law with re-
spect to CERCIA releases).
9. See, e.g., Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1462 (concluding that broad language of
agreement, encompassing liability for any claims, includes future CERCLA claims).
For further discussion of the Marden holding, see infra note 14-21 and accompany-
ing text.
10. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.J.
1988) (agreement did not release Ashland from CERCLA liability since it did not
expressly refer to liability for hazardous waste disposal). For a discussion of the
Southland holding, see infra note 50-55 and accompanying text.
11. 992 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1993).
12. Id. at 406. For a discussion of the court's reasoning in applying state law,
see infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
13. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 406-07.
19941 509
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and describes the First Circuit's reasoning in that decision. Part IV
analyzes the decision by focusing on CERCLA's objectives, the vari-
ous federal and state interests involved, and the intentions of the
contracting parties. Finally, Part V examines the repercussions of
this decision and advocates the development of a federal common
law rule.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Applying State Contract Law: The Broad Language
Approach
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.14 is the seminal case espous-
ing the broad language approach. This approach requires all-en-
compassing language in an agreement that is intended to transfer
CERCLA liability. 15 In Mardan, the parties executed a settlement
agreement and general release and receipt after Mardan purchased
the assets of Macmillan, a company that manufactured musical in-
struments.16 However, when the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") ordered Mardan to pay cleanup costs for a contaminated
settling pond, Mardan sued Macmillan under CERCLA to recoup
its cleanup expenses. 17
In Mardan, the Ninth Circuit determined that even though a
federal statute was at issue, the district court correctly applied state
contract law.' 8 In so doing, the court found that forging a uniform
14. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
15. Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, For example,
in Rodenbeck, Marathon was released "from all claims and obligations of any charac-
ter or nature whatsoever .... " Rodenbeck, 742 F. Supp. at 1457. The court held
that the broad language of the release included release from CERCLA liability. Id.
For a further discussion of the Rodenbeck decision, see infra notes 26-30 and accom-
panying text.
16. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1456. Among the assets Mardan purchased from
Macmillan was a musical instrument manufacturing plant in Nogales, Arizona. Id.
at 1455. Prior to the sale, Macmillan manufactured instruments for ten years at
the plant, depositing its wastes into a settling pond. Id. at 1456. Macmillan had
informed the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") about the hazardous
waste pond, but EPA granted interim status for the settling pond. Id. In 1983,
after the purchase by Mardan, EPA brought an enforcement action against
Mardan for violation of the interim status requirements. Id.
17. Id. Under a consent agreement with EPA, Mardan promised to close the
settling pond and install a groundwater monitoring system. Id. Mardan believed
the cost of complying with the consent agreement could run as high as $1.5 mil-
lion. Id. Mardan was unsuccessful in its action against Macmillan at the district
court level. Id. at 1457. The district court awarded summaryjudgment to Macmil-
lan in part because it found that Mardan's GERCLA claim was precluded by the
release. Id.
18. Id. at 1457. The court agreed with an amicus brief filed by the United
States. Id. The brief argued that a "uniform federal rule should not be developed
4
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body of law for interpreting CERCLA release contracts was not only
unnecessary, but also would foster uncertainty in contractual rela-
tions. 19 The court then examined the terms of the agreement, em-
ploying state law principles of contract interpretation. 20 In
construing the terms of the contract, the court concluded that the
broad language of the release necessarily included a release of CER-
CLA liabilities.21
In contrast, the dissent in Mardan argued that a uniform fed-
eral rule should be fashioned to require that any release of CER-
CLA liability through contractual provisions be express. 22
According to the dissent, adoption of a federal rule in the CERCLA
context is mandated both by congressional intent23 and by the
United States v. Kimbell Foods24 test, which outlines criteria for deter-
mining whether a federal rule should be created to preempt ex-
isting state law.2 5
to govern the issue of whether and when agreements between private 'responsible
parties' can settle disputes over contribution rights under section 107." Id. at
1458.
19. Id. at 1458-60. Recognizing that Congress did not clearly indicate whether
a federal rule should be applied, the court used the three-pronged test articulated
in United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979). According to the test, a
court must determine: "(1) [W]hether the issue requires 'a nationally uniform
body of law'; (2) 'whether application of state law would frustrate specific objec-
tives of the federal programs'; and (3) whether 'application of a federal rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.'" Mardan, 804 F.2d at
1458 (quoting Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29). Applying this test, the court con-
cluded that a uniform rule was unnecessary since commercial entities interpret
indemnity provisions under state law as a matter of course. Id. Second, the court
determined that applying of state law would not frustrate the purposes of CERCLA
since indemnity or release agreements cannot eliminate liability to the govern-
ment. Id. at 1459. Finally, the court held that applying a federal rule would create
confusion and uncertainty because buyers and sellers would not know which law
governed their agreements. Id. at 1460.
20. Marden, 804 F.2d at 1460-61.
21. Id. at 1462. The release absolved Macmillan of liability for any claims
"'based upon, arising out of or in any way relating to the Purchase Agreement
*... ' " Id. (quoting settlement agreement). Additionally, the court considered
extrinsic evidence in reaching its conclusion. Id. It was undisputed that Mardan
knew that the settling pond was hazardous and knew that corrective action would
be necessary in the future. Id.
22. Id. at 1463 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
23. Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). In reaching this conclusion, Judge Rein-
hardt, speaking for the dissent, analyzed the scant legislative history of CERCLA.
Id. Judge Reinhardt noted that Representative James Florio, CERCLA's House
sponsor, suggested the need for uniformity under CERCIA. Id. at 1464. Although
Representative Florio's comments referred to CERCLA liability rather than CER-
CIA releases, Judge Reinhardt found that a uniform federal rule would advance
congressional goals in both instances. Id.
24. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
25. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1464 (Reinhardt J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the Kimbell Foods test, see supra note 19. Judge Reinhardt maintained that
1994]
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In Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co.,26 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Indiana interpreted the lan-
guage of two release agreements.2 7 The parties executed these
agreements when the plaintiff lessors terminated their service sta-
tion lease with the defendant lessee.28 Applying the broad lan-
guage approach, the Rodenbeck court held that even though the
contracts did not specifically refer to CERCLA liability, the general
nature of the releases included future causes of action of any vari-
ety.29 Unlike the court in Mardan, however, this court did not first
determine the propriety of establishing a federal rule regarding
CERCLA releases.30
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp.31 held
that the broad language used in several sales agreements trans-
"[u]niformity with respect to releases from CERCLA liability is necessary to prevent
the vagaries of differing state laws from affecting the incentive for voluntary clean-
up." Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1464 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Further, he asserted
that applying state law slows response to clean-up actions as parties will be en-
couraged to let the government undertake cleanup and then pay their share later.
Id. at 1465 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Reinhardt concluded that
commercial relationships will not be adversely affected by a uniform federal rule;
since federal law governs federal releases, there is no element of unfair surprise.
Id.
26. 742 F. Supp. 1448 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
27. Id. at 1456. In December 1987, Rodenbeck and Marathon signed two
agreements; one cancelled a service station lease and the other was an agreement
for lease of real estate. Id. at 1453. The release stated that" '[e]ach party hereto
expressly discharges and releases the other from all claims and obligations of any
character or nature whatsoever arising out of or in connection with said agree-
ments .... '" Id. (quoting "Release of Claims").
28. Id. at 1451. After the lease terminations, the plaintiffs received a purchase
offer which required ground testing in accordance with EPA standards. I. The
test results indicated substantial soil contamination, and the matter was reported
to the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management ("DEM"). Id.
After conducting further testing, DEM informed plaintiffs that a substantial
cleanup would be required. Id. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against Marathon
for indemnification. Id. Marathon moved for summary judgment, contending
that the release agreements entered into by the parties barred all claims against
Marathon. Id. at 1452.
29. Id. at 1456-57 (construing contract language to mean that release from
CERCLA liability was clearly included).
30. Id.
31. 807 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). This decision was affirmed by the Sec-
ond Circuit at 62 U.S.L.W. 2209 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 1993). The Second Circuit held
that even though CERCLA was not in effect at the time of the agreement, the
language of the agreement evinced a "clear and unmistakable intent" to release
the seller from all liability, including unknown future liabilities. Id. In reaching its
decision, the court weighed the equitable arguments of the parties. Id. The court
acknowledged that the buyer's position was persuasive because it may have been an
innocent purchaser. Id. However, the court noted that two sophisticated parties
entered into the contract with the expectation that it would govern their relation-
[Vol. V. p. 507
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ferred CERCLA liability to the purchasing entity.3 2 Pursuant to the
agreements, Conalco purchased Olin's aluminum operations, in-
cluding a site contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls
("PCBs").33 In applying state contract law to the agreements, the
court reiterated the points stressed by the Mardan court.3 4 Specifi-
cally, the court applied the KimbellFoods test and found the develop-
ment of a federal rule unwarranted because state contract law was
sufficiently well-developed to provide an answer to the dispute.3 5
In United States v. Hardage,36 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit advocated the broad language approach to
interpreting indemnification agreements. In Hardage, the govern-
ment brought suit against thirty-seven defendants for the cleanup
ship. Id. Thus, the court deferred to the language of the contract and concluded
that its broadly worded provisions transferred liability to the buyer. Id.
32. Id. at 1142. Until 1973, Olin operated an aluminum manufacturing facil-
ity in Hannibal, Ohio. Id. at 1135. The processing equipment Olin used produced
hazardous polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), and Olin was informed about this
hazard in 1972. Id. Olin responded by constructing an incinerator, but failed to
eliminate contaminants from the impoundment pool or from the soil. Id. In
1973, Olin sold its aluminum operations to the Consolidated Aluminum Corpora-
tion ("Conalco"). Id. The parties executed several broadly-worded agreements re-
lating to the purchase that purported to absolve Olin of any post-divestment
liabilities. Id. In 1986, upon inspecting the Hannibal site, the Ohio Environmen-
tal Protection Agency ordered Conalco to undertake remedial measures. Id.
While Conalco complied, it sought contribution from Olin. Id. Olin refused to
cooperate and filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking absolution from liabil-
ity under the terms of the agreements. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1140-41. The court initially determined that neither the statute it-
self nor CERCLA's legislative history addressed the issue. Id. This conclusion was
consistent with the Mardan court's analysis. The Mardan court also found congres-
sional intent unclear as to whether to formulate a federal rule for CERCLA re-
leases. For a discussion of the Kimbell Foods test, see supra note 19.
35. Olin, 807 F. Supp. at 1140-41. The court asserted that a uniform federal
rule was unnecessary since state contract law was well-developed in the area of
releases and indemnifications. Id. at 1141. In examining the second factor of the
Kimbell Foods test, the court found that utilizing state law would not frustrate CER-
CIA's goals because it would not preclude the government from recovering re-
sponse costs. Id. Additionally, the court asserted that a federal rule might
interfere with relationships predicated on state law since parties might reasonably
expect their agreements to be governed by state law. Id.
The Second Circuit upheld the district court's decision to apply state rather
than federal law. See Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 62 U.S.L.W.
2209. However, the Second Circuit did not engage in any analysis of congressional
intent or the Kimbell Foods test. Instead, the court relied on its decision in Com-
mander Oil Corp. v. Advance Food Serv. Equip., 991 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1993), for
the proposition that while "federal law governs the validity of releases of federal
causes of action.., state law ... provide[s] the content of federal law." Id.
36. 985 F.2d 1427 (10th Cir. 1993).
7
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of a waste disposal site.37 In a latter phase of the litigation,38 a de-
fendant filed an indemnity claim against a codefendant based upon
certain provisions in their disposal contracts.3 9 Rather than devis-
ing a federal rule, the court relied on state law principles in inter-
preting the contract.40 The court applied Oklahoma law and held
that the indemnification language was broad enough to include
CERCLA liability.41
In sum, the broad language approach suggests that courts in-
terpret releases to effectuate the contracting parties' intentions.42
Courts applying this analysis often presume that environmental lia-
bility was within the contemplation of the parties if the contract
language is sufficiently all-encompassing. 43
37. Id. at 1431-32. Collectively, the 37 defendants were organized as the
Hardage Steering Committee ("HSC"). Id. at 1432. The defendants joined forces
to contest various elements of the government's proposed cleanup remedy. Id.
38. The suit had to proceed in four phases due to the complexity of the litiga-
tion. Id. In the first phase, the district court determined the appropriate clean-up
remedy. Id. In the next phase, the court determined the respective liability of the
parties as responsible parties under CERCLA. Id. In this phase, McDonnell Doug-
las Corporation ("MDC") and most of the other defendants stipulated to liability as
generators of waste. Id. United States Pollution Control, Inc. ("USPCI") was
found liable as a transporter of hazardous waste. Id. Phase III of the litigation
settled all cross-claims and third-party claims. Id. In this third phase, MDC
brought an indemnity claim against USPCI. Id. Phase IV allocated response costs
among the parties. Id. The appeal concerned the district court's handling of
Phase III and Phase IV of the litigation. Id.
39. Id. By virtue of two contracts between the parties, USPCI agreed to trans-
port and dispose of hazardous waste generated by MDC. Id. at 1433. These con-
tracts contained several indemnification provisions. Id. One provision stated that
USPCI released MDC from liability "from any claim of loss or damage resulting
from the transporting or disposal of said materials." Id. at 1434 (quoting Attach-
ment A to both contracts).
40. Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1433. The court determined that a uniform federal
rule was unnecessary since the government's ability to recoup cleanup costs under
CERCLA would not be impeded by an allocation of liability among the parties. Id.
at 1433 n.2. Furthermore, the court noted that the litigants agreed that state law
applied. Id. at 1433.
41. Id. at 1434. The court concluded that the indemnity provision unambigu-
ously released MDC from liability. Id.
42. Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Mgmt. Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1409, 1415
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (determining mutual intent of the parties is essential to interpreta-
tion of contracts). See also Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 930-931 (D. Me. 1990) (where intention of parties not
clear from contract, summary judgment cannot be granted).
43. See, e.g., Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1434-35 (finding that because of all-inclusive
language of indemnity agreement, parties intended to include environmental lia-
bility); American National Can, No. 89 C 0168, 1990 WL 125368, at 3 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
22, 1990) (broadly-worded release presumably contemplated future environmental
liability).
[Vol. V- p. 507
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B. The Express Language Approach: Moving Towards
Uniformity
The more narrow approach to interpreting indemnity agree-
ments requires that agreements specifically mention environmental
liability in order to transfer CERCLA costs. While some are still
reluctant to require a uniform federal rule to this effect, several
courts have nonetheless embraced this approach.
For example, in Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World
Industries,4 generators of hazardous waste argued that a landfill
owner assumed environmental liability through various waste dispo-
sal contracts and could not recover costs from the generators. 45
The generators argued that the landfill owner had contractually
warranted for safe and legal waste disposal46 and agreed to indem-
nify the generators for any costs incurred in connection with the
disposal.47 The court held, however, that since the contracts bore
no express provisions releasing the generators from environmental
liability, the landfill owner could attempt to recover response
costs.
4 8
44. 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
45. Id. at 1292. While Chemical Waste Management ("Chem Waste") was the
owner of the landfill site at the time of the CERCLA litigation, the generators had
previously contracted with the Sabatrol Corporation. Id. at 1287. In 1980, Chem
Waste purchased the assets of the Sabatrol Corporation. Id. After the purchase,
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources ("DER7) found viola-
tions of the DER permit and ordered Chem Waste to take corrective action. Id. at
1288. Eventually, the parties reached a settlement under which Chem Waste was
forced to comply with the DER orders. Id. at 1289. In 1985, Chem Waste brought
suit against the generators of the waste for recovery of CERCLA response costs. Id.
46. Id. at 1293. The defendant generators claimed that Chem Waste war-
ranted the disposal of waste both expressly and impliedly. Id. As for the express
warranty argument, the defendants failed to provide the court with any applicable
contract provisions. Id. at 1293-94. Additionally, the court rejected the implied
warranty argument. Id. at 1294. The court maintained that it would not "engage
in judicial legislation that would reshape CERCLA's liability scheme." Id.
47. Id. Here again, the defendants argued that Chem Waste had expressly
and impliedly agreed to indemnify the generators. Id. Because Armstrong had
not proved that it had in fact contracted with Chem Waste, the court dismissed the
express indemnity argument. Id. at 1295. The court also refused to find an im-
plied warranty. Id. Alluding to the policy goals of CERCLA, the court remarked,
"[i]f owner/operators and generators wish to redistribute the risks distributed by
Congress, they must do so clearly and unequivocally." Id.
48. Id. at 1294. The court held that an owner of a hazardous waste facility
could seek past and future response costs from a transporter in connection with
the cleanup of hazardous substances. Id.
A New York federal district court handed down a similar decision, refusing to
impose liability on a transporter of hazardous waste who entered into a broadly-
worded indemnity agreement with a waste generator. See New York v. SCA Servs.,
No. 83 Civ. 6402, 1993 WL 355348, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1993). See also Scott
Dean, Waste HaulerAvoids CERCLA Liability: First Impression Ruling by FederalJudge in
9
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The court in Southland Corporation v. Ashland Oil, Inc.49 used a
similar analysis. Southland Corporation ("Southland") purchased a
contaminated chemical plant from Ashland Oil ("Ashland"). 0 At
the behest of the NewJersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, Southland undertook remedial clean-up measures on the
plant site.5 ' When Ashland refused to contribute to the cleanup,
Southland filed suit.52 Seeking to evade CERCLA liability, Ashland
claimed that Southland had assumed all liabilities through the
purchase agreement executed between the parties.5 3 The court dis-
agreed. 54 Because the agreement did not explicitly refer to "CER-
CLA-like" liabilities, the court held that Ashland was not freed of
liability, and Southland was entitled to seek recovery for contribu-
tion of cleanup costs.55
New York, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 1993, at 9 (discussing New York v. SCA
Services, Inc.). According to Dean, this decision was the first federal decision
favoring waste transporters. Id. The judge interpreted the contract language as
indemnifying the generator only for liabilities resulting from the transporter's re-
moval, storage, or disposition of the waste. New York v. SCA Services, Inc., No. 83
Civ. 6402, 1993 WL 355348, at *4. Since the generator's CERCLA liability
stemmed from its own activities in arranging for the disposal, and not the trans-
porter's activities, the agreement did not include CERCLA liability. Id.
49, 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.NJ. 1988).
50. Id. at 997. Southland purchased the facility from Ashland in 1978. Id.
Presumably, Southland was aware of environmental hazards at the plant since
problems had been discovered there ten years earlier. Id. Ashland took corrective
action at the site as a result of a 1975 consent judgment with the NewJersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection ("DEP"). Id. At the time of the purchase,
however, DEP was still expressing concerns about groundwater contamination. Id.
51. Id. at 998. After in-depth studies revealed extensive contamination,
Southland was obliged to conduct a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study
("RI/FS"). Id. In 1987, Southland entered into an administrative consent order
which required it to launch clean-up efforts. Id.
52. Id. at 998. Southland petitioned Ashland for contribution several times
before and after the RI/FS. Id. at 997-98.
53. Id. at 997. In support of its theory that Southland contractually assumed
CERCLA liabilities, Ashland referred to an "as is" provision, an indemnification
provision, a waste removal provision, and a two-year survival provision. Id. at 1001.
54. Southland, 696 F. Supp. at 1002. The court examined each provision of
the agreement in turn. First, the court held that the "as is" provision only barred
claims based on breach of warranty. Id. at 1001. Second, the court examined the
waste removal provision. Id. Concluding that the provision would only preclude a
breach of contract claim, the court commented that it was "far from being the
express assumption of liability which Ashland argues it is." Id.
Lastly, Ashland maintained that the indemnification provision, along with the
revocation of this indemnification two years later, bolstered Ashland's contention
that it was relieved of all liability. Id. at 1002. However, the court dismissed this
argument by asserting that even if all of Ashland's promises were terminated,
Southland would only be barred from bringing a breach of contract action. Id.
55. Id. The court recognized that the parties could not have referred to CER-
CLA in the agreement since the contract was executed prior to CERCLA's enact-
ment. Id. Notwithstanding, because the agreement was "completely lacking in any
10
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C. Fashioning a Uniform Federal Rule
By far, the large majority of courts have refrained from estab-
lishing a uniform federal rule to interpret contracts in the CERCLA
context. However, a few courts have urged the establishment of a
uniform federal rule requiring an express release of CERCLA liabil-
ity. The district court in Weigmann & Rose International Corp. v. NL
Industries56 took this position. Disregarding state law, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California held
that an "as is" clause in a purchase contract did not relieve a seller
of CERCLA liability.5 7 The court pointed out that the disputed
clause was standard in every deed,58 and CERCLA expressly forbids
such general conveyances from transferring liability to the pur-
chaser.5 9 Because the statute itself prevents an "as is" clause from
transferring liability, the court did not look beyond the statutory
language in its interpretation.6 0 Accordingly, the court held that
federal law, not state law, controls the interpretation of "as is"
clauses.6 1
In Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,62 the United States District
Court for the District of NewJersey moved further towards creating
language which expressly release[d] Ashland from future liabilities based on its
hazardous waste disposal practices," the court still held that the contract did not
transfer CERCLA liability to Southland. Id.
56. 735 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1990). In 1975, NL Industries sold property
(Site R) to Weigman & Rose. Id. at 958. In 1987, at the instigation of the Califor-
nia Department of Health Services, Weigman & Rose excavated the land and
found buried metal drums that had been leaking hazardous waste. Id, In 1988,
Weigman & Rose filed suit against NL Industries to recover response costs. Id. NL
Industries argued that the "as is" clause in the conveyance relieved NL of any CER-
CIA liabilities. Id. at 959.
57. Id. at 962.
58. Id. at 961. The court asserted that the "as is" clause was "standard, boiler-
plate language routinely included in every contract and deed .... " Id. The court
distinguished this contract from the agreement in Mardan. Id. The Mardan agree-
ment was executed after the purchase agreement and was intended to settle all
disputes between the parties. Id.
59. Id. at 962. The court strictly construed the first sentence of CERCLA
§ 107(e) as preventing "as is" clauses from transferring CERCLA liability. Id. The
first sentence of CERCIA § 107(e) provides: "No indemnification, hold harmless,
or similar agreement or conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or
operator.., to any other person the liability imposed under this section." CER-
CIA § 107(e) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1). This provision ensures that "buyers and
sellers remain liable to third-party claimants irrespective of the agreement between
them. In this manner, private agreements allocate costs without diluting CERCLA
liability." Bereday, supra note 6, at 202.
60. Weigman & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957, 962 (N.D.
Cal. 1990).
61. Id. As an aside, the court mentioned that the same result probably would
have been reached under state law. Id. at 962 n.4.
62. 761 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1991).
1994] 7
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a federal rule. In that case, the parties had executed an assumption
agreement, which, according to Allied, transferred CERCLA liabil-
ity to Mobay.63 Relying on the Mardan dissent,64 the court devised a
federal rule to interpret the assumption agreement. 65 The court
held that to promote the goals of CERCLA, an agreement purport-
edly transferring CERCLA liability must explicitly refer to "environ-
mental-type liabilities."66 Because the assumption agreement made
no such reference, the court did not absolve Allied of CERCLA
liability.67
In spite of these precedents, the Boston Gas court applied Mas-
sachusetts state law in formulating its own rule. 68 According to the
court, the language of an agreement must be broad enough to act
as a general release or it must specifically recognize future environ-
mental liability if it is to effectively transfer CERCLA liability from
party to party.69
11. JoHN S. BoYD Co. v. BOSTON GAS Co.
A. Facts
Until 1951, the Lynn Gas and Electric Company ("LGEC"), in
addition to producing electricity, only manufactured coal gas.70
When natural gas became available, LGEC stopped producing coal
gas and produced only natural gas and small quantities of oil gas to
63. Id. at 347. Allied argued that since the clause included damages from
"any condition existing, substance consumed or discharged," and environmental
liabilities existed at the closing date, Mobay accepted liability. Id. at 355.
The parties executed the assumption agreement in 1977 after Harmon Colors
(predecessor to Mobay) purchased the site from Allied. Id. at 348. In 1986,
groundwater samples taken at the site showed the presence of hazardous sub-
stances. Id. In 1988, the NewJersey Department of Environmental Protection and
Mobay executed an administrative consent order, requiring Mobay to undertake
remedial measures. Id. As a result, Mobay sued Allied for contribution under
CERCLA. Id.
64. Id. at 351-52. After pointing out the ambiguity of CERCLA's legislative
history, the Mobay court reviewed the Kimbel Foods test. Id. at 351. For a discussion
of the Kimbell Foods test, see supra note 19 and accompanying text The court basi-
cally adopted the analysis employed by the dissent in Mardan. Id. at 351-52. For a
discussion of the Mardan dissent, see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
65. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351-52.
66. Id. at 357-58. In its analysis, the court also relied on Chemical Waste
Mgmt, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987),
and Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988), for the
proposition that a release of CERCIA liability must be express. Id. at 357. For a
full discussion of the cited decisions, see supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
67. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 358.
68. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 406.
69. Id. at 406-07.
70. Id. at 403.
[Vol. V.: p. 507
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supplement its supply of natural gas.7 ' In 1957, New England Elec-
tric System ("NEES") bought 97% of LGEC.72 Two years later,
NEES created the Lynn Gas Company ("Lynn Gas") and structured
a transaction whereby Lynn Gas acquired the gas-producing por-
tion of LGEC. 73 LGEC kept the electric portion, changed its name
to Lynn Electric, and later merged into the Massachusetts Electric
Company.74
As part of the transaction, the parties executed a separation
agreement in which Lynn Gas agreed to assume" 'all the duties and
liabilities of [LGEC] related to such gas business.' "-5 In 1973, NEES
sold Lynn Gas to Boston Gas, an unaffiliated company.76 Boston
Gas agreed to assume only the existing liabilities.77
After discovering coal and oil gas waste on the land, the subse-
quent purchasers sued NEES, its subsidiaries and Boston Gas for
contribution of resulting CERCLA cleanup costs. 78 The court held
Massachusetts Electric liable, as the successor to Lynn Gas and Elec-
tric Company, for the cleanup of the coal gas waste. 79 The court
also found NEES responsible for the cleanup of the oil gas waste.80
While the court's opinion consisted of three parts, this Note focuses
solely on Part I of the decision, the issue of liability for the coal gas
waste. 8 1
71. Id. This process was called "peak shaving" because the oil gas was manu-
factured only in peak periods of gas use. Id.
72. Id. NEES was a holding company owning various utilities. Id.
73. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 403. NEES then merged Lynn Gas into its gas
division. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting separation agreement). By the terms of the agreement,
Lynn Gas promised to "'indemni fy and save harmless Lynn Electric Company
from any duty or liability with respect to the gas business.'" Id. at 404 (quoting
separation agreement). Despite this agreement, the separation between the two
entities was not completed until 1970 when LGEC (then Massachusetts Electric)
conveyed the last of the gas-related parcels to Lynn Gas. Id.
76. Id. The SEC ordered NEES to divest itself of its gas holdings. Id.
77. Id. Boston Gas agreed to assume existing liabilities in the Purchase Agree-
ment and in another document termed "Assumption of Liabilities." Id.
78. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 403. Boston Gas also filed a claim against NEES,
alleging that NEES was responsible for the oil gas waste on the property that Bos-
ton Gas had purchased from Lynn Gas. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. While in Part II of the decision the court initially addressed contract issues
between Boston Gas and Lynn Gas arising from the Closing Agreement, the court
quickly dispensed with this issue since the language of the contract expressly lim-
ited liabilities to those existing at that time. Id. at 407.
The rest of Part II addressed whether a parent company is liable for the debts
of its subsidiary. Id. at 407-08. Part III addressed residual matters not relevant to
this discussion. Id. at 408-09.
19941 519
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B. Narrative Analysis
Before attempting to determine which party was liable for
clean-up costs in light of the various contracts involved, the Boston
Gas court first determined who the potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") were under CERCLA 82 As the court recognized, when
two corporations merge, the surviving corporation is liable for CER-
CLA clean-up obligations.83 If more than one corporation is a re-
sponsible party, however, the government can pursue any and all
corporations. 8 4 Nevertheless, the court pointed out that CERCLA
does not bar two or more parties from contractually allocating
responsibility.8 5
After concluding that the parties theoretically could have allo-
cated responsibility by agreement, the First Circuit then considered
the validity of the alleged allocation. 86 Ultimately, the court de-
82. Id. at 404. The court first looked to CERCLA § 9607(a) to define "respon-
sible parties." For the statutory definition of "responsible parties" under CERCLA,
see supra note 4.
83. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 404 (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909
F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court needed to make this determination
in order to impose liability on Massachusetts Electric as the successor to LGEC. See
also Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.
1988) (stating that in a merger, debts and liabilities are responsibility of surviving
entity); Walsh, supra note 5, at 454 (stating that liabilities are absorbed by existing
corporation after merger or consolidation); FLETCHm, supra note 3, § 7121, at 226
(stating that liability is sometimes mandated by statute).
84. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 405. For a discussion of potentially responsible
parties, see supra note 4. After the government seeks response costs from one PRP,
that party may recover from other responsible parties in a cost recovery action. See
Bereday, supra note 6, at 175. However, this method of cost recovery often results
in inequitable liability schemes because "[i]iable parties are not always responsible
for creating the initial pollution." Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, purchasers
who are negligent in their inspection of the property may be as liable as flagrant
polluters. Id.
85. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 405. The court remarked that "indemnification
and release agreements are 'tangential' to the enforcement of CERCLA." Id. (cit-
ingJones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials and Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 692 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
CERCLA permits parties to contractually relieve themselves of liability. See
CERCLA § 107(e) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1). For a discussion of CERCLA
§ 107(e) (1), see supra note 6 and accompanying text. However, some scholars
have suggested that the efficacy of indemnification agreements is still questiona-
ble. See generally Dolan, supra note 6. Noting that some courts have been reluctant
to uphold indemnity agreements when one of the parties is confronted with CER-
CLA costs, Dolan concludes that PRPs have reason to be apprehensive. Id. See also
Bereday, supra note 6, at 166-67 (asserting that because private risk allocation is
still controversial, buyers and sellers face uncertainty in commercial expectations).
Bereday concludes that "private risk allocations transfer exposure to potential lia-
bility, not liability in fact." Id. at 198.
86. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 405. The court considered whether liability had
shifted via agreement from LGEC to Lynn Gas and then to Boston Gas. Id.
[Vol. V. p. 507
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cided that Boston Gas had not assumed liability for the coal gas
waste.87 Moreover, the court found that not even Lynn Gas had
assumed liability because the separation agreement between Lynn
Gas and LGEC did not include a transfer of environmental liabil-
ity.88 Instead, environmental liability remained with LGEC and its
successor, Massachusetts Electric.8 9 In reaching this conclusion, the
court examined the language of the separation agreement and an
indenture entered into between Lynn Gas and LGEC. Because
these documents did not explicitly mention environmental liability,
the court then attempted to ascertain the intention of the parties.90
Initially, the court noted that the district court had wavered in
deciding whether to apply a federal or state rule of contract inter-
pretation. 91 Noting that the majority of courts relied on state sub-
stantive law,92 the First Circuit decided to follow suit. Applying
Massachusetts law,93 the court held that for the agreement to have
transferred CERCLA liability, the language must have been broad
enough either to foresee future liability or to relieve LGEC of all
liability through a general release. 94 In the court's opinion, the
separation agreement language failed on both counts. 9 5
After scrutinizing the separation agreement, the court con-
ceded that the general language attempted to relieve LGEC of all
liability related to the gas-producing business.96 However, the court
found it significant that the separation agreement then listed those
87. Id.
88. Id. When NEES sold the gas portion of LGEC to Lynn Gas, the agreement
did not include a release from liability. Id.
89. Id. Massachusetts Electric was the surviving corporation after its merger
with LGEC. As such, it absorbed all of LGEC's debts and liabilities. Id. For a
discussion of successor liability, see supra notes 3 & 5 and accompanying text.
90. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 406.
91. Id.
92. Id. The court asserted that most courts apply state law "so long as it is not
hostile to the federal interests animating CERCLA." Id.
93. Id. at 406. In formulating a rule, the court relied on two propositions
from Massachusetts state law. First, laws enacted after an agreement has been con-
cluded are not considered part of that agreement unless the parties clearly in-
tended them to be. Id. (citing Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health
and Hosp., 481 N.E.2d 441,452 n.13 (Mass. 1985)). Second, when the language of
a release is broad enough to include future liability, that release should be given
full effect" 'even if the parties did not have in mind all the wrongs which existed at
the time of the release.'" Id. (quoting Naukeag Inn, Inc. v. Rideout, 220 N.E.2d
916, 918 (Mass. 1966)).
94. Id. at 406-07.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 407.
1994]
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obligations specifically.97 In the court's opinion, this specific lan-
guage diluted the effects of the broad language and failed to men-
tion future liabilities of any sort.98
The court also found that the indenture only summarily listed
the liabilities assumed by Lynn Gas.99 Conceding that the list of
liabilities might not have been exhaustive, the court decided that
construing the agreement to include then-nonexistent liabilities
would be unreasonable. 100
Applying its rule of contract interpretation, the court deter-
mined that neither the separation agreement nor the indenture
evinced an intent to transfer environmental liability.101 Thus, the
First Circuit held that the district court correctly found Massachu-
setts Electric liable as a responsible party under CERCLA for the
cleanup of the coal gas waste. 10 2
IV. DISCUSSION
In fashioning its state law rule requiring broad language to
transfer CERCLA liability, the Boston Gas court neglected to con-
sider the advantages of a uniform federal rule in applying potential
transfers of CERCLA liability. Following the majority of federal
courts, the First Circuit declined to impose a federal rule. 103 Before
bowing to precedent, however, the court should have considered
CERCLA's overriding purpose 0 4 and balanced the competing fed-
97. Id. The list related to aspects of the business such as serving customers,
honoring purchase and sale contracts, and providing reserves. Id.
This agreement was similar to the agreement in Robertshaw Controls Co. v.
Watts Regulator Co., 807 F. Supp. 144 (D. Me. 1992). There, the court held that
the agreement was not all-encompassing enough to transfer CERCLA liability be-
cause the broad language was mitigated by specific limitations. Id. at 154.
98. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 407.
99. Id. Despite acknowledging that a general liability provision existed, the
court reasoned that the provision's reference to debts on the balance sheet re-
vealed that Lynn Gas was only assuming liabilities that existed at the time this in-
denture was executed. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 407. Massachusetts Electric was liable as the suc-
cessor to LGEC. For a discussion of successor liabililty, see supra notes 3 & 5 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of classifications of PRPs, see supra note 4.
103. In reaching this decision, the court cited a number of cases espousing
this "majority view." Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 406 (relying on United States v.
Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427 (10th Cir. 1993);Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials
and Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992); Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum
Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1133; Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp.
1448 (N.D. Ind. 1990)).
104. Layfield, supra note 5, at 1268 ("[A] uniform federal standard should
displace state law only to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of the federal statute.")
[Vol. V. p. 507
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eral and state interests in achieving uniform results in this area of
contract law.' 05
A. Is the Broad Language Approach Consistent With the
Purposes and Objectives of CERCLA?
In enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to provide a federal
cause of action to enable the government to recover cleanup ex-
penses promptly and to induce responsible parties to voluntarily
control environmental hazards.' 05 Congress hoped to make re-
sponsible parties pay for the cost of cleaning up waste sites rather
than spend taxpayer dollars to remedy the problem.' 0 7 While
neither Congress nor CERCLA has explicitly mandated a uniform
federal rule regarding releases from CERCLA liability,'08 a uniform
rule would promote CERCLA's purposes and goals.' 0 9 Such a rule
(emphasis added). However, CERCLA's goal of protecting all citizens from expo-
sure to hazardous materials suggests the need for a federal liability standard. Id. at
1269. Although states also have an interest in protecting their citizens, this interest
can be better served by imposing a nationally uniform liability standard. Id.
105. In deciding whether to apply a uniform federal rule, the federal interest
in intrastate uniformity should be weighed against the state's interest in the subject
matter. Id. at 1268.
106. See Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing H. REP. No. 1016, supra note 2, at 33). See also Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986)
(stating that Congress intended to provide government with means to act swiftly
and effectively in remedying hazardous waste problems); United States v. Bliss, 667
F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (stating that through creation of Superfund,
Congress intended to facilitate government recovery of response costs).
107. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92
(3d Cir 1988); Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 349 (D.NJ.
1991). See also Layfield, supra note 5, at 1269 (protecting tax dollars is federal
interest in CERCLA liability); Bereday, supra note 6, at 174 (by enacting CERCLA,
Congress wanted to shield taxpayers from absorbing liability for response costs by
forcing solvent PRPs to pay).
108. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351. The Mardan dissent noted that Congress
intended that a federal common law would be developed with respect to CERCLA
liability. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent asserted that "a uniform fed-
eral rule regarding releases from CERCLA liability serves Congress' goals in the
same manner that a uniform rule regarding liability does." Id. The dissent also
suggested that because federal law governs releases from a federal cause of action,
a federal rule should presumptively apply. Id.
109. See Bereday, supra note 6, at 208. The retributive force of CERCLA is
diluted when innocent purchasers are held liable, even though they are not in fact
responsible for the pollution. Id. Hence, if one party intends to assume environ-
mental liability, these liabilities should be explicitly mentioned in the contract to
avoid any uncertainties. Id. at 209-10. An allocation of this nature would be consis-
tent with CERCLA's fundamental goal of cleaning up polluted areas. Id. at 212.
See alsoJoseph A. Sevack, Note, Passing the BigBucks: Contractual Transfers of Liability
Between Potentially Responsible Parties Under CERCLA, 75 MiNN. L. REv. 1571, 1593
(1991) ("National uniformity is essential to best accomplish CERCLA's goals of
1994] 3
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would permit parties to allocate CERCLA costs without permitting
responsible parties to escape liability altogether." 0 At the same
time, a uniform rule would provide a consistent framework for de-
termining who must pay for cleanups."'
In contrast, the application of state law may well frustrate CER-
CLA's goal of ensuring rapid responses to environmental hazards.
Because CERCLA provides for cost recovery, the current operator
of a site can undertake remedial measures and seek contribution
from the original polluter." 2 However, with the application of
state law, an operator who enters into a broadly-phrased, boiler-
plate release may lose his right of recovery, despite the parties' true
intention. Thus, under this approach, the operator may choose to
let the government foot the bill for a cleanup rather than under-
take action on its own." 3 In order to recover tax dollars, the gov-
ernment will be forced to sue for contribution from the responsible
parties." 4  The disadvantages are obvious. Finite resources and a
plethora of problem sites hamper the government's ability to act
swiftly." 5 Additionally, government action is usually initiated only
after voluntary efforts have been exhausted." 6 Even when the gov-
ernment does attempt a cleanup, it must employ independent con-
tractors to clean up contaminated sites. These contractors are
promoting quick, voluntary cleanup and placing the financial burden on the re-
sponsible parties.").
110. See Bereday, supra note 6, at 207 (suggesting that Congress intended to
permit allocation of risk between parties as long as parties are dealing in arms-
length transactions). However, Congress also intended to prevent responsible par-
ties from transferring their liability to third parties such as the government. Id. at
206-07. See also Sevack, supra note 109, at 1592 (Congress imposed liability on both
past and present owners to preclude any responsible parties from escaping
liability).
111. Private agreements in purchase transactions provide certainty and stabil-
ity and allow parties to minimize risk. Bereday, supra note 6, at 208. However,
judicial inconsistency in dealing with these agreements "creates doubt and uncer-
tainty in real estate markets." Id. at 212. In addition, the uneven application of
state law produces "disparate results" and "uncertainty in the minds of the parties."
Sevack, supra note 109, at 1593-94.
112. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1464 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
113. Id.; Sevack, supra note 109, at 1592 (asserting that if operator or owner is
unable to obtain contribution, it may opt to wait for government to clean up site
and apportion liability among parties). If the government undertakes a cleanup,
"the owner or operator would be required to pay only its share rather than all the.
costs." Id.
114. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1465 (ReinhardtJ., dissenting).
115. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 352 (D.N.J.
1991) (stating that limited resources, coupled with multiplicity of sites, constrain
government's ability to act).
116. Id.; Sevack, supra note 109, at 1591 (asserting that government clean-up
action is last resort taken after voluntary efforts have failed).
[Vol. V. p. 507
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hesitant to accept clean-up contracts that could expose them to
enormous liability."17 Providing a federal rule that requires an ex-
press release of CERCLA liability will encourage current owners
and operators, who are best able to undertake cleanups, to do so."18
B. Weighing Competing Interests
Hazardous waste does not respect state boundaries. It is a
problem of national proportions."19 Therefore, it should be dealt
with at the national level. The Mobay court recognized this fact by
adopting a federal rule concerning releases from CERCLA liabil-
ity.' 20 According to the court, uniformity is necessary "to prevent
the vagaries of differing state laws from affecting the incentive for
voluntary cleanup."' 2 ' Of course, individual states have an interest
in contracts drafted in their respective states.122 However, given the
magnitude of the problem, the federal government's interest in the
117. The government may elect not to indemnify a contractor against liability
for negligence in the performance of a clean-up contract. See Environment -
Superfund - Government ContractorDefense, 58 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at D-
17 (Nov. 9, 1992). Obviously, because they fear exposure to liability, contractors
are reluctant to bid on clean-up projects. George Lobsenz, NSIA: Liability Concerns
Slow Cleanup, ENV'T WK., Dec. 19, 1991. In particular, defense contractors who
could offer technological breakthroughs in conducting cleanups are reluctant to
enter the environmental field. Id. According to the National Security Industrial
Association ("NSIA"), "many risk managers today believe it is safer for businesses to
produce weapons and ammunition than it is for them to become involved with
environmental pollution abatement and cleanup work." Id.
A report by NSIA recommended that legislation limit contractor negligence
liability through insurance coverage and surety bonds. Id. In 1993, EPA re-
sponded to contractors' concerns by setting guidelines for indemnification. EPA
Limits Indemnification to $50 Million, SUPERFUND WKJan. 22, 1993. If private insur-
ance is unattainable at reasonable prices, the agency will insure against negligence
claims for up to $50 million. Id. However, contractors are still dissatisfied. Id.
Peter Tunnicliffe, president of the Hazardous Waste Action Coalition, cautioned
that the guidelines will only increase the risks to contractors and leave "'the public
exposed to claims that the Superfund contractors cannot afford to absorb.'" Id.
118. See Sevack, supra note 109, at 1591 (suggesting that current owners and
operators of site are in best position to commence cleanups).
119. See Layfield, supra note 5, at 1269. Layfield recognized the strong federal
interest in CERCLA liability, stating that "hazardous-material regulation is a com-
plex national problem." Id. See also United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that hazardous waste release is "problem
of national magnitude involving uniquely federal interests").
120. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 352 (D.N.J. 1991).
For a full discussion of the court's decision, see supra notes 62-67 and accompany-
ing text.
121. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351.
122. See Bereday, supra note 6, at 210.
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containment of hazardous waste, as articulated in CERCILA, must
prevail.123
Additionally, as the Mobay court and the Mardan dissent sug-
gested, application of a uniform federal rule would not interfere
with existing state law relationships. 24 In reaching this conclusion,
both opinions emphasized that private parties should expect a fed-
eral rule to apply because of the well-established principle that fed-
eral law governs releases from federal liability.125 For this reason,
the Mobay court and the Mardan dissent advocated the adoption of
a uniform federal rule recognizing only express releases from CER-
CLA liabilities.126
Unfortunately, the Boston Gas court did not reach its decision
based upon a weighing of state and federal interests. Instead, with
little explanation, the First Circuit turned to state law, disregarding
the federal interests embodied in CERCLA.
C. Additional Considerations: The Intention of the Parties
In Boston Gas, the First Circuit's purported goal was to ascertain
the intent of the parties with respect to liability.'2 7 After analyzing
the language of the agreements, the court concluded that because
the agreements were narrowly drafted, the parties did not intend to
transfer future environmental liability.' 28 However, this conclusion
123. See Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 351 (stating that CERCLA represents "a sub-
stantial federal interest in the abatement of hazardous waste.") (citing United
States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984). Cf Layfield,
supra note 5, at 1269 (arguing for a uniform federal rule regarding successor liabil-
ity because "the federal interests in uniformity and interstate regulation of hazard-
ous materials outweigh the presumption in favor of state law.")
124. Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 352; Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d
1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Cf. Sevack, supra note 109,
at 1596 (maintaining that uniform federal rule prohibiting contractual allocation of
CERCLA costs would not disrupt settled expectations of parties). Arguably, it
would be "unrealistic to assert that parties will be unsure which body of law governs
their agreements." Id. Because of the persistent national clamor over CERCLA,
"[p]arties involved in the transfer of sites possibly contaminated with hazardous
waste are likely to be well aware of CERCLA's implications." Id.
125. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1465 (ReinhardtJ., dissenting); Mobay, 761 F. Supp.
at 352. In support of this position, the Mardan dissent pointed out that "irrespec-
tive of which rule governs CERCLA releases, documents covering transactions of
the type involved here must be prepared in light of applicable federal law."
Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1465 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). See also Sevack, supra note
109, at 1597 (stating that because of rule that federal law governs release of federal
claims, PRPs should not be surprised to find that federal law governs validity of
agreements allocating CERCLA costs).
126. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1466; Mobay, 761 F. Supp. at 357-58.
127. Boston Gas, 992 F.2d at 406.
128. Id. at 407.
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seems incongruous because it necessarily implies that had the lan-
guage been broader, the court would have foisted the intention of
transferring CERCLA liability upon the parties. 12 9 It is not at all
clear whether such a decision would have realized the parties' in-
tent. A rule requiring an express release of environmental liability
would eliminate any confusion.'3 0 Indeed, parties who executed
agreements prior to the CERCLA's enactment may not have fore-
seen the possibility of environmental liability and the necessity of
expensive cleanups.' 3 ' One way to ensure that the intention of
contracting parties controls liability apportionment is to require ex-
pressly-worded CERCLA releases.
V. IMPACt
The scope of Boston Gas is narrow because the court's interpre-
tation of purported CERCLA releases applies only when courts in
the First Circuit invoke Massachusetts state law.132 Moreover since
the Boston Gas court did not delineate exactly how broad is broad
enough language, courts must continue along the path of surgically
dissecting agreements, ever mindful of state law principles of con-
tract interpretation.
However, Massachusetts is not the only state confronting this
dilemma. Each state must fashion and apply its own rules regard-
ing the interpretation of releases in the CERCLA context. To avoid
this morass, federal courts should develop a federal rule. Not only
129. Cf Robertshaw Controls Co. v. Watts Regulator Co., 807 F. Supp. 144,
154 (D. Me. 1992) (maintaining that specific language of agreement made intent
of parties unclear).
130. See In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 126 B.R. 650, 653 (D. Mass. 1991)
(suggesting that more specific waivers of environmental claims may lead to result
that does not reflect what parties intended). However, this court advocated the
broad languiage approach only when the intent of the parties was clear. Id.
131. Since CERCLA had not been enacted at the time of the agreement in
Mobay, the court required a release of "environmental-type liabilities." Mobay, 761
F. Supp. at 358. See also Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994,
1002 (D.N.J. 1988) (requiring release of "CERCIA-like" liabilities). See also West-
wood Pharmaceuticals v. National Fuel Gas Dist. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1280
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[B]arring appropriate contractual language amply indicating
otherwise," asset purchaser did not release seller from CERCLA actions since stat-
ute was not in existence at time of purchase). But cf. American Nat'l Can Co. v.
Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp., No. 89-C0168, 1990 WL 125368, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22,
1990) (parties included unanticipated CERCLA claims in 1969 agreement that
unambiguously assigned risk of unforeseen liability); Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 736
F. Supp. 387, 393 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding that even though CERCLA was not
enacted at time of agreement, leakage of underground oil tanks was foreseeable
hazard contemplated by parties).
132. See Robertshaw, 807 F. Supp. 144 (D. Me. 1992) (applying Massachusetts
state law in diversity action).
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would a federal rule provide predictability and uniformity, 33 it
would also help effect the contracting parties' intent.'3 Requiring
parties to transfer CERCLA liability by express provisions would also
ensure that unwitting parties are not saddled with unanticipated lia-
bility.135 Lastly, a uniform federal rule is consistent with the poli-
cies underlying CERCLA. It would encourage current operators to
clean up hazardous conditions promptly, secure in the knowledge
that their right to contribution would not be barred by the vagaries
of state law.
Kiersten M. Murray
133. See Sevack, supra note 109, at 1597. Sevack suggests that "a uniform fed-
eral law governing the contractual transfers of CERCLA liability would promote
certainty on the part of . . . companies as to which law governed their agree-
ments." Id. Instead of attempting to decipher the intricacies of state law, compa-
nies could rely on one source to govern their agreements. Id. n.150.
134. In interpreting agreements, courts must attempt to effectuate the intent
of the parties. See Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Mgmt. Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1409,
1415 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
135. CERCLA imposes strict liability on current and former owners of land.
For a discussion of CERCLA's liability structure, see supra note 2. This standard
sometimes results in the imposition of liability on innocent purchasers, regardless
of their actual responsibility for causing the pollution. Bereday, supra note 6, at
169.
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